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Summary
This paper surveys political science literature in search of a proper concep-
tualization of political representation. The first section of the paper reviews 
most influential normative and theoretical understandings of political repre-
sentation. The section concludes with a summary of general attributes of the 
concept of representation which ought to be taken into consideration in each 
study on representation. The second section reviews empirical studies of po-
litical representation with one main intention: to provide a synthesis of differ-
ent empirical understandings of “who is being represented”, “what is being 
represented” and “who is the representative”. Instead of conclusion a novel 
model of the process of representation is presented at the end, which should be 
read as a conceptual map for future studies on political representation.
Keywords: political representation, subjects of representation, content of repre-
sentation, types of representatives
1 Introduction
New students of representation are often faced with an enormous body of literature 
with few constants. Representation scholars frequently disagree over understand-
ings of a broader concept of political representation. The concept of political re-
presentation is often poorly specified in political theory and divergently operation-
alized in empirical analysis. Moreover there is a clear gap between normative and 
empirical studies. Lack of cross-fertilization between normative and empirical re-
search left its consequences on the development of mid-range theories of political 
representation in quantitative research. As one might easily infer, different stan-
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dards of representation outlined in the literature have sometimes resulted in mutu-
ally incompatible assessments. 
This paper surveys the relevant literature in search of a proper conceptualiza-
tion of political representation. The first section of the paper reviews the most in-
fluential normative and theoretical understandings of political representation and 
concludes with a summary of the general attributes of the concept of representation 
which ought to be taken into consideration in each study on representation. The se-
cond section reviews empirical studies of political representation with one main in-
tention: to provide a synthesis of different empirical understandings of “who is be-
ing represented”, “what is being represented” and “who is the representative”. The 
paper concludes with a novel model of the process of representation which should 
be read as a conceptual map for future studies on political representation. 
2 Normative and Theoretical Approaches
Political philosophy, both traditional and contemporary, provides a rich ground-
work of discussions that give direct attention to the concept of representation. I will 
only shortly review the most influential theories of political representation with a 
special focus on the most recent developments. Proper debate on the “nature of po-
litical representation” started with the development of classical liberalism, English 
conservativism, and modern republicanism. 18th- and 19th-century theorists of re-
presentation were focused exclusively on two issues: (i) the aims of representation: 
whether the representative, in his function of a lawmaker, should aim at fulfilling 
the good of the entire nation/kingdom or the good of his constituency only; and (ii) 
the source of his judgement: whether he should rely solely on his own judgement or 
on the judgement of a third party (the constituency) (Rehfeld, 2009).
These two issues contribute to the famous mandate-independence controversy. 
In the empirical literature this controversy is sometimes framed by the terms “trus-
tees” and “delegates” seen as two opposing roles which representatives might have 
within each of these doctrines. On the one side, mandate theorists see representa-
tives as delegates who receive instructions from electors and are obliged to ally 
their opinion to the opinion of their constituency. On the other side, independence 
theorists, as an eighteenth-century response to imperative mandate requests, deny 
the power of delegation and believe that representatives should aim at the good of 
the entire nation by basing their decisions on their own independent judgement.
The most famous, and oft cited, proponent of the independence doctrine is 
Burke. His understanding of the role of a representative was an extension of his 
general vision of representative government, which Pitkin describes as “antidemo-
cratic, elitist hostility to unnecessary extensions of the franchise” (Pitkin, 1972: 
189). According to Pitkin, this is why Burke insisted on the representation of inter-
Politička misao, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2012, pp. 114-137
116
est and not representation of persons. Interests are unattached and objective – they 
are matters of knowledge and reason and not opinion or will. A representative is just 
a trustee who can follow their own understanding on the way of representing the 
interests of their nation.1
Burke is often taken as exemplar of an extreme view on representative inde-
pendence in later empirical work on political representation. However, Burke was 
surely not the first and certainly not the most convincing proponent of that position. 
Fairlie (1940) thus implies that the idea of practical representative independence 
was formulated long before 1774 when Burke presented his speech. As an exam-
ple, he refers to Milton (1660), who argued that after the elections representatives 
are not responsible to their constituents, and Sidney (1698), who also insisted that 
Members of Parliament are not merely ambassadors of a particular constituency 
will but had “full powers to act for the whole kingdom” (Fairlie, 1940: 240).
Contemporary theories of political representation date back to 1961 when Han-
nah Pitkin successfully defended her doctoral dissertation on the theory of repre-
sentation. It is not an overstatement to say that there is no single book or journal 
article on political representation that does not refer to some element of Pitkin’s 
dissertation published in 1967. It is astonishing that Pitkin’s book became the single 
most used source of theoretical work on political representation. It rarely happens 
that political scientists agree on one standard account of a concept, and, even more 
surprisingly, it is rare to find so many adaptations of the normative theory2 in prac-
tical, empirical research as is the case with Pitkin’s arguments. However, as many 
note (Mansbridge, 2003; Disch, 2011), what became a standard account of political 
representation in empirical research is exactly the opposite of what Pitkin intended 
to achieve. Most of those studies adopted one version of the dyadic representation 
models, exactly the model which Pitkin (1972) so fervently criticised. 
So why is Pitkin’s work so important? Pitkin provided a detailed elaboration of 
the different ways in which the term “representation” is defined in order to fully un-
derstand the concept. She compares it to “a rather complicated, convoluted, three-
dimensional structure in the middle of a dark enclosure” (Pitkin, 1972 :10). First 
of all, Pitkin, by relying on “ordinary-language” philosophy and semantic analy-
sis, studies the conceptual and theoretical origins of the term “representation”. She 
concludes this semantic voyage by extracting the central core of what representa-
1 In Burke’s own words: Parliament is not a Congress of Ambassadors from different and 
hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an Agent and Advocate, against other 
Agents and Advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative Assembly of one Nation, with one Inter-
est, that of the whole; ... You choose a Member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not 
Member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament (Burke, 1999).
2 Although some of Pitkin’s research could also be regarded as pure empirical work. 
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tion actually means. Secondly, she provides a simple, widely accepted, solution for 
the mandate-independence controversy, stemming from her new understanding of 
the concept of representation and, lastly, she introduces a new vision of the mobi-
lization concept of representation by making a dramatic break from the traditional 
American dyadic model of representation.
At the beginning she argues that political theorists provided at least four differ-
ent definitions of representation: (i) formalistic representation, (ii) descriptive re-
presentation, (iii) symbolic representation, and (iv) substantive representation, and 
sets two conditions that each definition of political representation must fulfil. First-
ly, representation must be conceptualized as an activity and, secondly, representa-
tion has to be substantive. Representation as activity means: “... acting in the inter-
est of the represented, in the manner responsive to him. The representative must act 
independently; his action must involve discretion and judgement; he must be the 
one who acts” (Pitkin, 1972: 209). From this it follows that representation contains 
a constitutive element, representation cannot be a simple mirroring of the character-
istics of the constituency. By acting as a representative, a person chooses which ele-
ments of the constituency deserve to be considered for “reproduction” (Dovi, 2007) 
– and the outcome of representation cannot be equal to its input. Two requirements 
are fundamental for Pitkin’s critique of formalistic, descriptive and symbolic repre-
sentation. None of these three approaches to representation include both represen-
tation as activity and substantive requirement. This leaves her with a “substantive 
acting for others” representation which Pitkin (1972) endorsed. 
The ability of constituencies to act as well as the ability of representatives to 
act has to be taken into consideration during the process of representation. This un-
derstanding stands in the middle of the mandate-independence controversy. One the 
one hand, one cannot expect that a representative should act only in the manner in 
which its constituents would like him or her to, and, on the other hand, one cannot 
expect that the representative would ignore their constituents and base his or her 
action solely on his or her independent judgement. Representation thus includes 
both poles, adding up to a paradoxical requirement: the represented is “simultane-
ously both present and not present”. These arguments lead to one, by now widely 
accepted, position within the normative camp – that there is no single governing 
rule which can tell us how a representative is supposed to act at all times (Rehfeld, 
2009).
However, what distinguishes Pitkin’s work from all previous understandings 
of political representation is the de-centered view on political representation which 
she offers in her final chapter. She breaks both from traditional political theorists 
and from the orthodox practical conception of representation by suggesting that po-
litical representation is not a “one-to-one, person-to-person relationship” (Pitkin, 
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1972: 221). Political representation cannot be reduced to a simple constituency-
representative relationship or to the measures of “congruence” as a match between 
constituents’ preferences and legislators’ votes. For Pitkin, “political representation 
is primarily a public, institutional arrangement” insofar as it involves “many people 
and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. 
What makes it representation is not a single action by one participant, but the over-
all structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple 
activities of many people” (Pitkin, 1972: 221-222).
Constituency is here replaced by the representation of an “unorganized group”: 
through the process of representation these groups are invented as constituencies 
from the whole (Disch, 2011). In fact, this is why Pitkin refers to representation as 
a complex phenomenon, since representation conceptualized as an activity which 
constantly reinvents itself cannot be easily assessed nor measured empirically. As 
she herself notes 40 years on, her conception did not address technical questions, in 
the end it offered “at most an overview of this troubling concept of diversity” (Pit-
kin, 2004: 336). 
After Pitkin (1972), the topic of political representation regained its visibi-
lity within contemporary democratic theory (Warren and Castiglione, 2004; Young, 
2000; Manin, 1997; Mansbridge, 2003, 2004, 2009; Rehfeld, 2005) and the demo-
cratic rediscovery of representation began (Disch, 2011). Renewed interest in politi-
cal representation resulted in a number of theoretical papers dedicated solely to par-
ticular aspects of political representation. Moreover some of these authors aim not 
only at providing normative suggestions on the proper conceptualization of repre-
sentation, but also insist on making these suggestions practical and “measurable”.
It is onerous to synthesise all that has been said on political representation since 
Pitkin. Yet it is possible to draw general lessons regarding the concept of political 
representation which could be a guide to future empirical endeavours. This list is by 
no means exhaustive since it focuses only on those parts of normative work which 
could be fruitful in thinking about facets of political representation in an empirical 
way. We can accordingly draw seven lessons from contemporary political represen-
tation theory.
1 Representation has to be understood as a relationship. Contemporary theorists, 
starting with Pitkin, agree that representation should be conceptualized as a “so-
cial relationship, constituted in part by shared meanings”. Conventional studies of 
representation take representation either as a top-down view from the perspective 
of the representative or as a bottom-up view from the perspective of constituents. 
Newer theory suggests that we should always look at representation in its entire 
dynamics. We should consider that both actors have an ability to act in the process. 
Moreover, this relationship should not be limited to the constituency-legislator dy-
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ads and simple principal-agent relationship. Representation, embedded in a social 
and cultural world, includes a wide range of political organizations and actors and 
it is never a one-way street. This process-based vision of representation should be 
taken into account when we create static measures of congruence which capture on-
ly one direction of the representational process: and it should be taken into account 
when we consider causal linkages between various representational elements.
2 Both inputs and outputs of representation are relevant. Representation should be 
conceptualized both as a process of collective decision-making (process represen-
tation), and as an output representation or legitimacy (concerned with the outcome 
of the process of representation). We should be interested in both what comes in 
the process and what the final result of the process is. In consequence, empirical 
research on political representation that focuses only on policy preference respon-
siveness is inadequate since it focuses only on the representational input and asks 
little about the actual output or, even further, about the actual outcome of represen-
tation.
3 Representation is not only electoral, territorial representation. This claim belongs 
to a new understanding of what should be represented, to a new understanding of 
constituencies. As the main initiator of this position, to which he dedicated an entire 
book, Rehfeld (2005) argues that electoral districts should not be constructed on the 
basis of permanent residence. He claims that “the use of territory to define electoral 
constituencies persisted as a habit of mind, a historical remnant no longer serving 
its original purpose of representing communities of interest, but so ingrained that it 
was never seriously challenged...” (Rehfeld, 2005: 9-10). He goes even further to 
suggest that we should remove territory from the equation and simply use random 
assignment of each potential voter to new electoral constituencies.
4 Multiple forms of political representation exist in practice. As one of the key pro-
ponents of the second generation of contemporary political theory of representation, 
Mansbridge (2003) is the one intent on bridging the gap between theory and em-
pirical approaches. She emphasises the multidimensional nature of representation 
and the need to operationalise representation in terms of different modes of repre-
sentation. She envisages representation as a continuous process that involves more 
than interest aggregation. She calls for an approach that will incorporate new under-
standings of representation as a process of deliberation through different channels 
of democratic politics, involving media, systems of socialization and civil society. 
5 Multiple forms of political representation interact. Both Pitkin and Mansbridge 
theorize about competing conceptions of political representation. Pitkin sees sub-
stantive acting for representation as the best solution, and discards formalistic, de-
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scriptive and symbolic representation. On the other hand, Mansbridge sees the im-
portance of all competing visions and says it is possible that they exist at the same 
time. However, neither of them discusses the consequences of all of these forms 
individually or combined for actual democratic practice. The big question here is 
how do these different forms of representation relate to each other and whether it is 
possible to justify these different visions and actual practices of representation with 
the pluralist nature of representative democracies (Dovi, 2006).
6 Representation should not be limited to electoral representation only. Electoral 
representation has its functional limitations. Higher stability of representative insti-
tutions implies that they are less flexible and they respond slowly to new identities 
and marginalized groups (Urbinati and Warren, 2008). Because of these limitations, 
many authors suggest looking at other, non-electoral, practices of representation. 
On the one hand, they look at a more active role of self-authorizing agents such 
as advocacy groups, NGOs or foundations, which is not necessarily beneficial for 
democratic practice, and, on the other hand, the call for a new form of citizen re-
presentatives. 
7 Linkage between representation and participation as complementary forms of 
citizenship. We should be concerned with linking, both in study and in practice, 
representation and participation. When only electoral representation is analysed, as-
sumptions are made about the “represented”. We pay attention to voters by exclud-
ing those who did not vote, are not eligible to vote or do not have the right to vote. 
This is a major setback in both traditional standard accounts of political represen-
tation as well as in the practice of empirical research. By broadening the scope of 
representation to non-electoral forms, analyses should also be broadened to include 
participatory input and to consider the influence of other domains of participation 
besides the ballot box.
3 Empirical Research
The very first examples of empirical research into political representation, both 
qualitative and quantitative, date back to the 1950s. They include a wide range 
of general and more specific research questions, methodological approaches and 
conceptualizations of political representation. In a review written in 1983, Jewell 
identified research on political representation in (i) studies of the representative 
character of legislative bodies; (ii) studies of legislators’ styles or roles of represen-
tation towards variously defined constituencies; (iii) studies of public opinion that 
ask about support for the representatives; (iv) studies of policy responsiveness and 
methodological papers on different measures of congruence; and (v) studies about 
other roles legislators might have in addition to the legislative function such as allo-
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cation and service activities. This list is not an exhaustive one since after the 1990s 
there is presence of the topic in (vi) studies on the opinion-policy nexus, (vii) stu-
dies on the representative character of the European Parliament, (viii) gender stu-
dies which mainly focus on descriptive representation of social groups, and, finally, 
(ix) comparative studies on vote-seat representation.
It is necessary to untangle the web of empirical representation studies by re-
viewing the most prominent work. With this aim this section provides a survey of 
the relevant literature in search for answers to the following questions: (i) who is 
being represented: Do representatives need to represent only voters, or should they 
represent all citizens? Are they representing individuals or groups of citizens? What 
constitutes a constituency?; (ii) what is being represented: Are we to be looking at 
ideological representation, preference aggregation, symbolic representation or at 
actual policy outcomes as results of representation?; (iii) who the representatives 
are and how they see their role as representatives: Are they individual legislators, a 
directly elected president, members of school boards or ministers and entire govern-
ments? Should a constituency be represented by one individual legislator or should 
the whole nation be represented by the entire parliament?
3.1 Who is Being Represented?
The question on the subjects of representation is the very first question any analysis 
of representation has to address. By defining the subjects we define whom to encom-
pass by the notion of “the people” that constitute the democratic domain; that is to 
say, we define the constituency. As said before, this issue has received new attention 
in normative theory. While constituency is often used as a synonym for electorate, 
some theorists and, in recent years, empirical researchers, argue as well that a con-
stituency should not be defined only within the legal frames of the electoral systems. 
Rehfeld (2005) offers a useful distinction between electoral and non-electoral con-
stituencies so as to differentiate between strictly electoral understandings of constitu-
encies and between other, more recent, definitions thereof. Figure 1 on the next page 
identifies the main approaches to the conceptualization of constituencies.
3.1.1 Electoral Constituencies
A major part of empirical research until the 2000s has used variations of electoral 
constituencies, and this is so mainly because of the widespread acceptance of the 
standard account of representation as a dyadic relationship between the representa-
tive and his electoral constituency. Only an individual representative is considered 
as the carrier of the representative act: moreover, constituents are defined solely as 
supporters of that particular representative, which excludes all of those who did not 
vote at all or all of those who did vote for election winners. 
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This is a particularly narrow understanding of representation – a step further 
would be to consider all eligible voters as the focus of representation. To distin-
guish between the two, which are both legitimate understandings of representation, 
Rehfeld notes that we can define electoral constituency in two ways: one, as “the 
group of people who are eligible to vote for a particular representative (or party)”, 
or, two, as “the group of people who voted for a particular representative (or par-
ty)” (Rehfeld, 2005: 35). As will be demonstrated later on, both of these defini-
tions, with additional nuances each, have been utilized in empirical research thus 
far. 
The entire electorate. By asking whether constituency opinion is substantively re-
presented in the US Congress, Miller and Stokes (1963) use this understanding in 
their seminal study by measuring the constituency opinion of all eligible voters in 
the districts. This formulation is also identical to the term “geographical constitu-
ency” used by Fenno (1978) and it is the most common use of the term constituency 
in the empirical literature. Fenno (1978) refers to the electorate as the geographical 
constituency since electoral constituency is often territorially based. 
Figure 1: Types of constituencies in empirical research




















All of those who actually voted. The second definition of electoral constituency by 
Rehfeld (2005) refers to all eligible voters who actually participated in elections 
and cast their vote regardless of their actual vote choice. Many researchers either 
use entire electorate or all voters in a district/state/region as a basis for measures 
of constituency preferences. Many studies that use survey data usually select only 
those who participated in elections when measuring constituency attitudes (Hansen, 
1998; Erikson and Wright, 1980; Erikson, 1971; Kuklinski, 1978; Converse and 
Pierce, 1979).
All voters of the winning party. The third definition of constituency, as a subgroup 
of all of those who actually voted, includes only those voters who cast their ballots 
for the winner of the election. In empirical literature this understanding is known 
under the term re-election constituency also coined by Fenno (1978). Scholars, such 
as Wright (1989) and Clausen (1973) argue that re-election constituency represents 
a more realist view of the representative process, since voters of the winning party/
representative should be more homogeneous and it is more likely to expect that they 
will manage to communicate their views to their representative more successfully 
than opposition voters. 
It does make a difference for a general understanding of representation whether we 
suppose that all eligible voters or only those who are part of the participant public 
have the right to be substantively represented in representative bodies. By narrow-
ing our understandings of constituencies to only those who voted or to only those 
who voted for the winning party/representative we are also reducing the scope of 
the concept of representation and we limit our conclusions to only one dimension 
of representation. Selection of the proper concept of constituency is always both a 
normative and an empirical question, and it should equally be guided by both spe-
cific research questions and by some general ideas of what political representation 
actually is for the researcher conducting the analysis.
3.1.2 Non-electoral Constituencies
Rehfeld (2005) defines non-electoral constituencies somewhat vaguely as “the 
group of people whose interests a representative (or a party) looks after and pur-
sues” (Rehfeld, 2005: 35). The basic premise of this definition is that a group of 
people should have some shared interests and some unique characteristics that will 
draw the attention of representatives. However, any group of two or more people 
can constitute a group with a shared interest and unique characteristics. These prob-
lems lead us to two fundamental questions. Are those interests and group charac-
teristics politically relevant and which politically relevant groups actually deserve 
academic attention?
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Verba and Nie (1972) provide the only definition – at least to my knowledge 
– of political relevance in the scientific literature. They define politically relevant 
group characteristics as those “whose visibility to a public official might make a 
difference in their responses to citizen participation” (Verba et al., 1995: 170). The 
range of politically relevant characteristics changes with those changes which occur 
in the political agenda and social structure. As a threshold for deciding on the sali-
ency of a characteristic Verba and others suggest that group characteristics should 
be pertinent to the political conflict, as well as that the group that is delimited by 
that characteristic should be clearly distinguishable from all other groups. 
Nonetheless, this definition obviously includes all possible combinations of 
characteristics. Interest groups such as professional and trade associations clearly 
fit this definition: they are homogeneous, publicly visible, and involved in various 
political conflicts; moreover, they are most likely to have different preferences than 
the overall electorate. But we rarely find any research on political representation 
that is concerned with the proper representation of interest groups. 
This leads us to the second problem of group representation: which groups, 
aside from electoral constituencies legally defined by electoral rules, deserve atten-
tion in research on political representation? Normative and empirical studies sug-
gest that we should be concerned with those groups who cannot, given their specif-
ic characteristics, be represented through conventional, mainly electoral, channels. 
They argue that we should be analysing the quality of representation of socially, 
economically and politically disadvantaged groups. 
Since the publication of Verba and Nie’s study on political participation in 
America in 1972, many empirical studies have shown that voters differ from non-
voters in their socio-economic compositions (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba 
et al., 1987; Verba, 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Their findings suggest 
that distinct socio-economic composition of these groups also leads to distinct ideo-
logical positions and policy opinions which might result in policies that bias non-
voters. As a result “unequal participation spells unequal influence” (Griffin and 
Newman, 2005: 1206). 
This group of scholars, such as Griffin (2011) or Childs (2008), focuses on 
minority representation, usually advances a positive view on descriptive represen-
tation, examines the impact of legislators’ race on their representation of speci-
fic groups of constituents (in most cases of African Americans, but lately of Latin 
Americans also), assesses the impact of electoral rules on election outcomes and 
on policy outputs relevant for minority and other socially disadvantaged groups, or 
analyses the concentration of minorities in electoral districts along with its impact 
on various political outcomes. A number of these studies have found that evident 
disparities exist among racial, ethnic, gender, age or educational groups. For in-
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stance, Griffin and Newman (2005) analyse patterns of minority representation of 
Latinos in the United States by focusing on the equality of government actions: they 
find that most members of the House of Representatives vote in ways that are closer 
to white constituents’ preferences than to those of Latino constituents.
3.1.3 Individuals as Constituents and All Residents as Constituents
Most of the empirical studies use public opinion surveys with individual responses 
on specific issue items; they aggregate those responses in order to calculate con-
stituency opinion. So why not conceptualize constituents as individuals, why not 
calculate individual differences of opinion between each constituent and his or her 
representative/party or parliament? Rehfeld (2005) actually says that the term “con-
stituent” was well known to political theorists as it appeared in The Federalist 53 
times, according to his count. He also argues that the term “constituency”, as a col-
lection of many individuals appeared relatively late, in the mid-nineteenth century. 
However, we find only one example of an analysis that takes individuals as consti-
tuents. Ruedin, in a recent paper (2012), considers measures of congruence between 
individuals as constituents and their individual representatives (one-to-one relation-
ship), and measures of congruence between individual constituents and collective 
representatives (one-to-many relationship).
Another novel approach to constituents has moved beyond group representa-
tion and even beyond a fundamental understanding of citizenship as a basis for full 
membership in a polity. Those authors ask for proper representation of non-citizens. 
Immigrant groups in many countries who do not have citizenship status and thus 
do not have basic political rights, groups like Moroccan migrants in France (Du-
mont, 2008), should have some political voice. These new streams of research ask 
not only for the expansion of social and political membership rights, but are also 
advocates of change in the understanding of political representation as based on 
citizenship rights.
3.2 What is Being Represented?
The empirical literature on political representation is a rich pool of sources for vari-
ous understandings of the content of representation. The content of representation is 
captured by this simple question: How do we conceptualize constituency will? The 
fundamental difference, already visible in the mandate-independence controversy, 
is a confrontation between preferences expressed and genuine interests. 
Traditional accounts of political representation, which Disch (2011) refers to 
as the “bedrock for social choice”, use a common-sense notion that representa-
tives should represent those preferences expressed by constituents. This vision of 
representation is also closely connected to classical understandings of democratic 
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representation, wherein representative democracy is defined as “continuing respon-
siveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl, 1971: 1). The 
second understanding of constituency will relates to the view that representatives 
should represent constituents’ interests. This is probably most visible in the oft-cited 
summary definition of representation Pitkin presented at the end of her book, where 
she argues that “representing here means acting in the interest of the represented...” 
(Pitkin, 1972: 209). 
This debate between preferences and interest representation is clearly visible 
in empirical research. Two, essentially not mutually competing accounts of repre-
sentation are usually employed: (i) preference representation as the representation 
of existing (and inevitably somewhat inarticulate) citizen demand regarding which 
policies to follow, and (ii) interest representation as the representation of anticipated 
choices citizens would make in an ideal situation of fullest possible understanding 
of alternatives and its consequences.
3.2.1 Preference Representation
Ever since the influential study by Miller and Stokes (1963), a central place in em-
pirical research was given to a comparison of policy preferences of constituents 
and representatives. Policy preferences were taken as the main measures of con-
Figure 2: Approaches to the content of representation























stituency attitudes. Figure 2 illustrates the main approaches which tried to capture 
constituency preferences. The key distinction is between an attitudinal approach 
which uses expressed attitudes toward specific issues, and a behavioural approach 
using actual behaviour to extract preferences. Attitudinal approach is most visible 
and it is mostly based on survey-extracted measures of individual positions towards 
specific-issue problems, more general issue domains, issue dimensions aggregated 
from answers to specific-issue problems and, finally, ideological self-placement of 
individual respondents. Behavioural approach is rare, but we do find several papers 
which use actual data on referendum or initiative vote to deduct constituency opi-
nion on issues that were subject to direct decision-making procedures. 
3.2.2 Interest Representation
Empirical studies on interest representation are still relatively rare. This is under-
standable since measuring constituency interest is not an easy task, neither in theory 
nor in practice. As we have seen before, interests are seen as those choices a per-
son would make if he/she had information on all possible outcomes of his choice. 
Ideally speaking, interest presupposes highly informed individuals and a naturally 
highly transparent political environment with readily available information. How-
ever, given the complex web of informational sources in developed democracies, 
and sometimes lack of directly relevant information, individuals often lack time or 
personal skills to consider all possible alternatives. Literature deals with this prob-
lem in two ways as demonstrated in Figure 2.
The first group of scholars, by using a bottom-up approach, suggests we should 
simulate constituency interest by using available information on individual prefer-
ences on various issues. Since theory suggests that constituency preferences might 
be substantively different from actual “enlightened preferences” or “genuine inter-
est” one approach is to use some form of counterfactual claims. Bartels assumes 
that individuals or groups of citizens with enough knowledge and information 
would choose alternatives reflecting their genuine interest (Bartels, 1991: 9-10). He 
proposes a model of simulating “enlightened preferences” by comparing the prefer-
ences “of group members with differing degrees of enlightenment, holding (actu-
ally or statistically) constant other factors that we expect to influence their prefer-
ences”. However, this model did not see any real applications in empirical research 
and many questions still remain open.
The second approach, a top-down one, is more present in the literature. The 
group of scholars in favour of this approach introduces measures of policy outputs 
and implications of actual policy outcomes for various constituents (Brooks, 1987; 
Jackson and King, 1989; Brooks, 1990; Bartels, 1991; Hill and Leighley, 1992; 
Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; Hill et al., 1995; Brettschneider, 1996). This approach is 
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based on a thought experiment; scholars decide what a desired policy output would 
be for certain groups given some of their selected characteristics. They move a step 
further from preference representation, and, in line with Pitkin’s recommendation, 
ask not only about input of policy preferences, but also about actual policy outputs 
and outcomes that should reflect the interests of the represented. Literature that fo-
cuses on policy outputs includes legislative and executive decisions such as bud-
getary spending, executive orders, international treaties or voting records of repre-
sentatives and can be summarised by the motto: “Watch what we do, not what we 
say” (Brooks, 1990). 
3.3 Who is the Representative?
The dilemma of the agent of representation has been the least controversial element 
of representative theory and empirical research. Standard principles of representa-
tive democracy clearly dictate that the carriers of representative acts should be only 
those who are directly elected by the constituents through elections. This implies 
that the main agents of representation should be either individual members of the 
legislature, political parties in the legislature or the legislature taken as a collec-
tive agent.3 We will refer to this view of representation as legislative representa-
tion. However, the literature on political institutions recognizes the importance of 
particular types of regimes (parliamentary, presidential and mixed) and of legisla-
tive electoral systems (majoritarian, proportional, multi-tier and mixed), as deter-
minants of political representation linkages. For instance, US scholars also examine 
responsiveness of directly elected President or Supreme Court justices. And scho-
lars in parliamentary systems sometimes analyse the impact of government ideo-
logy on types of policy outputs or outcomes. This approach indicates that we should 
also be looking at the quality of executive representation. Figure 3 illustrates this 
main distinction of the actors of representation.
3 In order to simplify the account on agents of representation I have focused only on abstract 
characterisation of most prominent agents of representation (parties, legislature and executive), 
neglecting, for the purpose of parsimony, more broader understanding of institutions which 
would include interest groups, mass media and other civil society actors. For instance, litera-
ture on interest group influence on agenda-setting and decision-making process is developed in 
the United States, but we rarely see attempts to analyse the impact of interest group politics on 
actual quality of representation of citizens both in the US and Europe. Notable exception is a 
recent book by Gilens (2012) that analyses whether interest groups influence policies in the di-
rection of more affluent individuals or their organized interest might favour the preferences of 
less-well-off Americans.
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3.3.1 Legislative Representation
The majority of studies on the linkage between constituents and representatives 
focuses on agents of representation as individual representatives, on political par-
ties in legislatures or on the legislature as a whole. Given the prominence of stand-
ard accounts of representation, the connection between constituency and individu-
al representatives is most commonly analysed. Here the concept of representation 
“involves correspondences between roll-call votes and the subjective policy pref-
erences (as revealed by verbal survey responses, sampled and simulated) of con-
stituencies” (Page et al., 1984: 749). Dyads of electoral constituency and individual 
candidates for Congress, representatives in the House of Representatives or indi-
vidual Senators are usually taken as units of analysis in dyadic representation mod-
els (i.e. one legislator and one constituency). This model has been dominant in the 
United States ever since Miller and Stokes’ study which was followed by a large 
number of publications even outside the United States. The most famous examples 
include a paper by Converse and Pierce (1979) on the roles of representatives in 
France, and their later book on the relationship between public opinion and policy 
from 1967 to 1973 (Converse and Pierce, 1986).
However, some have started to question this mainstream approach. Weissberg 
(1978: 535) argued that there exists a large tradition of normative work which views 
representation “in terms of institutions collectively representing people” and indi-
vidual representation is not the only way of approaching representation. Weissberg 
(1978) here refers to the Burkean understanding of representation of interests by 
trustees, where the purpose of the entire legislature was to represent the interest of 
Figure 3: Types of representatives
















the people. Since the individual legislator was not taken as delegate there was no 
reason to expect that in reality representation has to be deduced to constituency-
legislator pairs. All legislators collectively, no matter which district they had been 
elected from, should aim at representing the broadly conceptualized nation-wide 
constituency. Representation is hereby understood as a policy agreement between 
the majority of all citizens and the majority of all legislators. The concept of collec-
tive representation introduced by Weissberg (1978) did not have a large impact on 
the practice of analysing dyadic representation in the United States. 
The third model of representation according to the actors of representation is 
the responsible party model. This model is partly developed from the idea of re-
sponsible party government, whilst partly inspired by the collective representation 
concept of Weissberg (1978). Although collective representation was no match for 
the undisputed dyadic model of representation in the US, it did find many followers 
in parliamentary democracies of Western Europe. The notion of responsible party 
government assumes that the party which wins the elections represents the national 
majority. Members of the winning party should be seen representing their electoral 
districts only if the majority opinion of that district is actually congruent with the 
majority opinion of the whole electorate (Weissberg, 1978). 
This simple understanding was also evident in the political practice of Western 
democracies. In countries that use proportional representation electoral systems, 
such as the Netherlands with the whole country a single electoral constituency, there 
is no clear connection between the constituency and individual members of legis-
lature. And in countries such as Sweden where dyads could be analysed, party dis-
cipline was so strong that roll-call votes of individual legislators did not vary at all 
outside of party boundaries. Similar problems were detected in other Western coun-
tries which led researchers, the first of whom was Thomassen (1994), to present an 
alternative view to dyadic representation models: that of the responsible party mo-
del. In the responsible party model, party discipline is essential to the survival of the 
government; political parties and not individual representatives should be analysed 
as main agents of representation.
3.3.2 Executive Representation
The importance of government for the representative process is often ignored, but 
some research does go a step further and asks about the linkage between public 
preferences and executive decisions. The concept of executive representation comes 
from two sources: (i) literature that focuses on interest representation by measuring 
policy outputs and outcomes and (ii) literature that analyses the representative cha-
racter of directly elected President and Supreme Court justices in the US. 
The most visible example of a policy approach to executive representation is 
a work by Brooks (1985, 1987, 1990) on the US, Canada, the UK, France and Ger-
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many. He studies the actual nexus between mass opinion and governmental policy 
in a comparative manner, which was a novelty for classical public opinion-policy 
research conducted mainly in the US at that time. He compares the distribution of 
the “national mass sentiment” measured by various opinion polls to public policy 
defined as “governmental actions or positions regarding selected issues as indicated 
by legislative, executive, and/or judicial decisions”. His measure of representation 
is the so-called “democratic frustration score” which indicates the level of incon-
sistency between public opinion and public policy. Not surprisingly, Brooks does 
not refer to this measure as a measure of representation as he positions himself 
clearly in the field of opinion-policy research. This could also be the reason why 
he takes government actions and the US Supreme Court decisions into considera-
tion, since this was an unusual practice for mainstream representation research. 
Conversely, whether intentionally or not, Brooks did move a step further to actual 
analysis of executive representation.
The second example of executive research is specific for the United States 
since many executive functions there are filled by means of direct electoral proce-
dures and, according to the standard account of representation, it does make sense 
to ask whether the President, Supreme Court justices or Governors are responsive 
to their electorate. The most common question on presidential responsiveness is 
whether public opinion affects presidential policy-making. For instance, Jacobs and 
Shapiro (1995) analyse the impact of public mood on leadership role and respon-
siveness of Clinton during his first year in office. 
4 Analytical Model of the Process of Representation
Political scientists understand the connection between citizens and representatives 
in terms of linkages. The ways in which linkages are achieved are called modes, 
types or forms of political representation. This paper has demonstrated that the lite-
rature offers a variety of, sometimes overlapping and thus confusing, concepts: 
such as symbolic representation, surrogate representation, ideological congruence, 
policy congruence, opinion-policy nexus or opinion thermostat, policy agreement, 
interest representation or gyroscopic representation. I have discussed most of these 
different understandings of representation, both in normative and empirical stu-
dies, hopefully in an order which clarifies why differences between concepts ac-
tually occur in the literature and where these different understandings originate 
from. However, several questions remain open. How do we analyse the ways in 
which these different understandings of representation (given by who, what and by 
whom questions) interact and form a complex process of representation? And, can 
these notions of representation be generalized and applied in various political con-
texts?
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To answer the first questions we need a model in which we can see the overall 
process of political representation understood as dynamic relationship. The most 
straightforward way is to understand this process in terms of different types and 
levels of linkages. Figure 4 illustrates an adjusted vision of political representation 
linkages created on the basis of normative suggestions and findings from empiri-
cal literature presented in this chapter. This model is similar to Powell’s chain of 
democratic responsiveness but, as causal arrows show (dotted lines), it does not end 
with policy outputs or with policy outcomes (Powell, 2004).4 Political representa-
tion process, in this hexagonal projection, is presented as a circular phenomenon. 
We expect that final policy outcomes will have an effect on citizens’ attitudes and 
4 Powell (2004) provides a schematic overview of the concept of systematic responsiveness. He 
argues that democratic responsiveness occurs “when the democratic process induces the govern-
ment to form and implement policies that the citizens want”. He sees democratic responsiveness 
as a chain of causally connected links. At the first stage citizens’ preferences are formulated. 
Stage 2 refers to the process whereby citizens’ attitudes influence citizens’ voting behaviour. Citi-
zens’ voting behaviour influences election outcomes and government formation at stage 3 and, 
finally, the process of linkages ends with government formation affecting public policies and out-
comes.
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behaviour. This expectation comes from many studies on the opinion-policy nexus, 
which demonstrate that a reciprocal relationship that goes from elites to citizens 
should also be analysed.
The hexagonal model of political representation starts with a linkage between 
citizens’ attitudes and behaviour and legislative attitudes (1). This linkage might 
occur through various mechanisms. The most common mechanism is the election 
process where citizens’ preferences are aggregated by the act of voting (under vari-
ous types of electoral laws and regulations). However, elections are not the only 
mechanism that creates this linkage. Citizens also might choose alternative forms 
of involvement, some of which are more content- and information-rich. Most com-
monly discussed are petitioning, protests, campaigning, membership in non-go-
vernmental organizations or unions. Three types of representation (dyadic, party 
and collective) were already discussed and it is assumed that each of these ap-
proaches has its shortcomings and benefits, but they are all based on the comparison 
of citizens’ attitudes and legislative attitudes or behaviour.  
The second linkage (2) illustrates the connection between legislators’ attitudes 
and legislators’ actual behaviour. We assume that legislators’ attitudes come prior to 
legislators’ behaviour so other factors considered have to be placed before attitudes 
and not as direct influences on behaviour. However, as Weissberg (1978) early no-
ticed, the most important limitation of representation studies is the focus on micro-
level analysis of individual congressmen behaviour and not on the responsiveness of 
the whole political system. Thus many authors who followed this advice decided to 
focus on policies and legislative acts themselves as aggregate output of entire legisla-
tures and not on individual legislators’ behaviour. In this case units of analysis are not 
individual representatives and their roll-call vote records, but entire legislature and 
output that comes from the legislature – specific legislative acts (policy outputs).
The third linkage (3) connects two types of representation based on constitu-
tional divisions of power: legislative and executive representation. This linkage is 
mainly determined by specific institutional arrangements of the political systems. 
The type of institutional arrangements and real constitutional practice will influ-
ence whether agenda-setting powers lie mostly in the hands of the legislature or 
in the hands of the executive branch. These settings will in turn have an impact on 
the process of interest representation, where actual policies and policy outcomes 
come into the picture, and not solely preference representation. What follows is a 
linkage between policy outputs in form of legislative and executive acts and actual 
policy outcomes (4). This part of the representation process has not been analysed 
by many scholars. Usually, the literature on democratic performance focuses on 
these issues. Scholars in this field ask whether specific institutional arrangements, 
ideological composition of the government or type of government influence spe-
Politička misao, Vol. 49, No. 5, 2012, pp. 114-137
134
cific policy outcomes such as unemployment rates, quality of living conditions or 
economic growth.
And, finally, the last linkage depicts a relationship between actual policy out-
comes and citizens’ attitudes and behaviour (5). This stage is usually analysed by 
those who research the opinion-policy nexus and by scholars who form election 
forecasting models. Although many of them ask about the impact of public opini-
on on policy outputs and outcomes, some argue that the causality might also flow 
the other way. Actual policy outcomes, such as high unemployment, might have an 
effect on the behaviour of citizens on election day or on the behaviour of citizens 
through other, non-electoral, channels of involvement.
The presented model has demonstrated how different understandings of modes 
of representation can work together if we take political representation as a process. 
What remains to be discussed is how these ideal linkages work in different structu-
ral conditions. Future research should focus on within-country temporal differences 
and cross-country variations in the quality of representation so we could distin-
guish the impact of specific institutional arrangements on the process of citizen-
representative linkages. Moreover, analysis of the quality of representation should 
be grounded both in normative prescriptions and previous empirical findings. Be-
cause, as Thomassen argues, “the purpose of most studies of political representa-
tion is not to develop a causal model of political representation that can explain as 
much as possible of the empirical reality of the process of political representation, 
but to assess to what extent political reality is consistent with the normative ideal” 
(1994: 237). 
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